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Abstract
In many-to-many matching models, substitutable preferences constitute the
largest domain for which a pairwise stable matching is guaranteed to exist.
In this note, we extend the recently proposed algorithm of Hatfield et al. [3] to
test substitutability of weak preferences. Interestingly, the algorithm is faster
than the algorithm of Hatfield et al. by a linear factor on the domain of strict
preferences.
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1. Introduction
In stable matching problems, the aim is to match agents in a stable manner
to objects or to other agents, keeping in view the preferences of the agents
involved. These problems have significant applications in matching residents to
hospitals, students to schools, etc. and have received tremendous interest in
mathematical economics, computer science, and operations research [see e.g.,
2, 7].
In many matching models individual preferences are supposed to be respon-
sive. E.g., in the case in which a hospital can hire multiple doctors, the hospi-
tals are usually and unnaturally assumed to submit preferences that render the
choice between a pair of doctors independent of other available outcomes [3].
This assumption is rather unnatural, in particular if multiple agents can be
matched to a single agent. An alternative is to allow hospitals to submit substi-
tutable preferences, which allows for considerably more flexibility in expressing
preferences over groups of doctors.
Substitutable preferences were introduced by Roth [8] and constitute the
largest domain in which stable matchings are guaranteed to exist. In many
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matching models, substitutability is in fact a necessary and sufficient condition
for the existence of stable allocations (see footnote 4 in [3]).1 The significance
of substitutability leads to the natural algorithmic problem of testing whether
a given preference relation is substitutable or not. Recently, Hatfield et al. [3]
presented a polynomial-time algorithm for this problem. Both the original def-
inition of substitutability and the testing algorithm assume that agents express
strict preferences, i.e., preferences without any indifferences. Strict preferences
are assumed for most of the results in the literature concerning substitutability.
Sotomayor [9] formulated a natural extension of substitutability for the more
general preference domain which allows indifferences (so-called weak prefer-
ences). In many settings, allowing indifferences is not only a natural relaxation
but also also a practical requirement: as agents may not be able to strictly
rank the respective outcomes and might be indifferent among some of them.
The introduction of indifferences can significantly change the properties and
structure of stable matchings. For example, stable matchings can have different
cardinalities [5] and man or woman-optimal stable matchings are no longer well-
defined for marriage markets [7]. Weak preferences can also induce non-trivial
complexity. For instance, checking whether a stable roommate matching exists
is polynomial-time solvable for strict preferences [4] but becomes NP-complete
when indifferences are allowed [6].
In this brief note, we examine the notion of substitutability for the general
case of weak preferences.2 We identify conditions that are violated by non-
substitutable preferences. Using these conditions, we obtain a polynomial-time
algorithm to test substitutability of weak preferences. Restricted to the domain
of strict preferences, our algorithm is faster than the algorithm of Hatfield et al.
[3] by a linear factor.
2. Preliminaries
Let U be a finite set of alternatives. A (weak) preference relation R is a
transitive and complete relation on 2U . Let P and I denote the strict and
symmetric parts of R, respectively. Each preference relation R induces a choice
function C that returns, for each X ⊆ U , the set of all R-maximal subsets of
X , i.e.,
C (X) = {Y ⊆ X : Y R Z for all Z ⊆ X}.
A set X ⊆ U is called acceptable if X R ∅. Observe that C always returns
at least one set (maybe the empty set) and that all sets returned by C are
acceptable.
1The settings include many-to-one matchings, many-to-many matchings, and many-to-
many matching with contracts.
2Despite the fact that indifferences can significantly affect results in matching theory,
Sotomayor [9] showed that this generalized notion still guarantees the existence of a stable
matching in many-to-many matching models.
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The most general and expressive way of representing R is via a preference
list L that contains all acceptable sets. This list representation is reminiscent to
the representation by individually rational lists of coalitions used in the context
of hedonic coalition formation games [1].
Let s denote the maximal size of an indifference class, where an indifference
class is a family {Y ∈ U :X I Y } for some acceptable subset X in U . Observe
that the size of C(·) is bounded by s and that a preference relation is strict if
and only if s = 1. Furthermore, let u denote the size of U and ℓ = |L| the
number of acceptable sets.
Example 1. Let U = {a, b, c, d} and define the preference relation R by the list
{a, b, d} I {b, c, d} P {a, b} I {b, c} I {a, c} P ∅.
Then, C(U) = {{a, b, d}, {b, c, d}} and C({a}) = {∅}.
For a preference relation R represented in list form and X ⊆ U , it can be
checked in time O(ℓ|X |) whether a given alternative is in C(X).
3. Substitutability and weak preferences
The following definition was introduced by Sotomayor [9].
Definition 1. A preference relation R is substitutable if and only if the fol-
lowing two conditions hold:
(S1) for all non-empty A,B ⊆ U with B ⊆ A we have that for all X ∈ C (A)
there is some Y ∈ C (B) such that X ∩B ⊆ Y , and
(S2) for all non-empty A,B ⊆ U with B ⊆ A we have that for all Y ∈ C (B)
there is some X ∈ C (A) such that X ∩B ⊆ Y .
Example 2. Consider the preference relation R from Example 1. It can be
verified that R satisfies (S1) and violates (S2). For the latter, take A = U and
B = {a, b, c}. Then,
C(B) = {{a, b}, {b, c}, {a, c}}.
Now Y = {a, c} is in C (B), but there exists no X ∈ C (A) such that X∩B ⊆ Y .
Hence, R is not substitutable.
The following lemma is adapted from Lemma 1 in [3].
Lemma 1. For all A,B ⊆ U with B ⊆ A,
C (A) ∩ 2B 6= ∅ implies C (B) = C (A) ∩ 2B.
Proof. Assume C (A) ∩ 2B 6= ∅. Then, X ∈ C (A) ∩ 2B for some X ⊆ U . First
consider an arbitrary Y ∈ C (B). Then Y R X . Hence, Y ∈ C (A) ∩ 2B as well.
Now consider an arbitrary Y /∈ C (B). If Y /∈ 2B, immediately Y /∈ C (A)∩2B . If
Y ∈ 2B, we haveX P Y and therefore Y /∈ C (A). Also then Y /∈ C (A)∩2B .
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4. Testing substitutability
We now outline a way to test substitutability of weak preferences. The idea
utilizes an insight from [3] that instead of checking all violations of substitutabil-
ity, one may restrict one’s attention to violations of a specific type.
By an (S1)-violation for R we understand a pair (A,B) ∈ 2U × 2U such that
B ⊆ A and for some X ∈ C (A), it is the case that X ∩B * Z for all Z ∈ C (B).
Lemma 2. Let R be a preference relation. If there exists an (S1)-violation
for R, then there exist X,Y ∈ L and x ∈ X such that (X ∪ Y, Y ∪ {x}) is also
an (S1)-violation for R.
Proof. Assume that (A,B) is an (S1)-violation for R. Then there is some X ∈
C (A) such that X ∩ B * Z for all Z ∈ C (B). As C (B) 6= ∅, there is some
Y ∈ C (B) such that Y ∩ X is maximal with respect to set inclusion, i.e.,
Y ∩ X ( Z ∩ X for no Z ∈ C (B). Obviously, X,Y ∈ L. By our assumption,
X ∩B * Y and we may therefore assume the existence of some x ∈ X \ Y . We
prove that (X ∪ Y, Y ∪ {x}) is an (S1)-violation for R, i.e.,
(i) Y ∪ {x} ⊆ X ∪ Y ,
(ii) X ∈ C (X ∪ Y ), and
(iii) X ∩ (Y ∪ {x}) * Z for all Z ∈ C (Y ∪ {x}).
As x ∈ X , it is obvious that (i) holds. As for (ii), observe that X ∈ C (A) ∩
2X∪Y . Lemma 1 implies C (X ∪ Y ) = C (A) ∩ 2X∪Y and thus X ∈ C (X ∪ Y ).
Finally, consider an arbitrary Z ∈ C (Y ∪ {x}). Observe that Y ∈ C (B) ∩
2Y ∪{x}. By another application of Lemma 1, we get C (Y ∪{x}) = C (B)∩2Y ∪{x}
and, therefore, Z ∈ C (B). Moreover, by choice of Y , there is some z ∈ X ∩
(Y ∪ {x}) such that z /∈ Z. Hence, X ∩ (Y ∪ {x}) * Z, which proves (iii).
By an (S2)-violation for R we understand a pair (A,B) ∈ 2U × 2U such that
B ⊆ A and for some Y ∈ C (B), it is the case that Z ∩B * Y for all Z ∈ C (A).
Lemma 3. Let R be a preference relation. If there exists an (S2)-violation
for R, then there exist X,Y ∈ L and x ∈ X such that (X ∪ Y, Y ∪ {x}) is also
an (S2)-violation for R.
Proof. Assume that (A,B) is an (S2)-violation for R. Then there is some Y ∈
C (B) such that Z ∩B * Y for all Z ∈ C (A). As C (A) 6= ∅, there is some X ∈
C (A) such thatX∪Y is minimal with respect to set-inclusion, i.e., Z∪Y ( X∪Y
for no Z ∈ C (A). Obviously, X,Y ∈ L. By our assumption, X ∩B * Y and we
may assume the existence of some x ∈ X \ Y . We prove that (X ∪ Y, Y ∪ {x})
is also an (S2)-violation for R, i.e.,
(i) Y ∪ {x} ⊆ X ∪ Y ,
(ii) Y ∈ C (Y ∪ {x}), and
(iii) Z ∩ (Y ∪ {x}) * Y for all Z ∈ C (X ∪ Y ).
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As x ∈ X , (i) obviously holds. As for (ii), observe that Y ∈ C (B) ∩ 2Y∪{x}.
Lemma 1 implies that C (Y ∪ {x}) = C (B) ∩ 2Y ∪{x} and thus Y ∈ C (Y ∪ {x}).
Finally, consider an arbitrary Z ∈ C (X ∪ Y ). Observe that X ∈ C (A) ∩
2X∪Y . Another application of Lemma 1 yields C (X ∪ Y ) = C (A) ∩ 2X∪Y and,
therefore, Z ∈ C (A)∩ 2X∪Y . Moreover, by choice of X , we have Z \ Y = X \ Y
for all Z ∈ C (A) ∩ 2X∪Y . In particular, x ∈ Z. Since x /∈ Y , we obtain
Z ∩ (Y ∪ {x}) * Y , which proves (iii).
We can utilize Lemmas 2 and 3 to obtain a polynomial-time algorithm to
check the substitutability of a preference relation.
Theorem 1. It can be checked in time O(ℓ2u2(ℓ+ s2)) whether a given prefer-
ence relation is substitutable.
Proof. To test substitutability, we need to check whether both (S1) and (S2)
hold. This is equivalent to verifying that neither an (S1)-violation nor an (S2)-
violation exists.
The algorithm works as follows. Instead of checking all possible violations
of (S1) and (S2), we can use Lemmas 2 and 3 to restrict our attention to only
certain types of possible violations. The algorithm exhaustively checks all these
types of possible violations.
Let us first consider the case of (S1). To check (S1), we know from Lemma 2,
that we can restrict our attention to violations of the form (X ∪ Y, Y ∪ {x}) for
some X,Y ∈ L and x ∈ X . Therefore, the maximum number of pairs we need
to check is upper-bounded by
(
ℓ
2
)
u.
Verifying an (S1)-violation of type (A,B) = (X ∪ Y, Y ∪ {x}) requires us to
do the following:
• compute C(A) which takes time O(ℓu),
• compute C(B) which takes time O(ℓu), and
• test the main condition: for all X ∈ C (A) there is some Y ∈ C (B) such
that X ∩B ⊆ Y . Testing the condition takes time O(s2u).
Therefore, verifying a violation of type (A,B) = (X ∪Y, Y ∪{x}) takes time
O(ℓu) +O(ℓu) +O(s2u) = O(ℓu+ s2u).
The time needed to check whether an (S1)-violation exists is then equal to
the maximum number of pairs we need to check multiplied by the time required
to verify one (S1)-violation which equals
O(
(
ℓ
2
)
u)×O(ℓu+ s2u) = O(ℓ2u(ℓu+ s2u)).
The same analysis holds for checking whether an (S2)-violation exists.
Therefore there exists an algorithm which runs in time O(2ℓ2u(ℓu + s2u)) =
O(ℓ2u(ℓu + s2u)) = O(ℓ2u2(ℓ + s2)) and tests the substitutability of a prefer-
ence relation.
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By letting s = 1, we get the following.
Corollary 1. It can be checked in time O(ℓ3u2) whether a given strict preference
relation is substitutable.
5. Conclusion
We examined substitutability of preferences which may include indifferences.
It was shown that this general notion of substitutability can be tested in time
polynomial in the length of the preference relation in list form. On the domain
of strict preferences, the (worst case) asymptotic running time of the algorithm
turns out to be slightly faster than the algorithm of Hatfield et al. [3] (O(ℓ3u2) as
compared to O(ℓ3u3)). As pointed out by Hatfield et al. [3], “such an algorithm
could be distributed to market participants for use in the preparation of their
preference relations for submission.”
In contrast to other results in matching theory, allowing indifferences does
therefore not affect the tractability of testing substitutability. It will be inter-
esting to explore the extent to which allowing indifferences affects other recent
results concerning substitutability.
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